How and why Greece will leave the euro zone

This post is a special members-length weekly that I am making public because it is a continuation of the ideas for a Greek exit for the euro zone that I published on Friday. This post, however, also incorporates specifics that Marshall Auerback has laid out in a separate post and demonstrates why exit is the likely option.

Now, the Greek exit scenario I outlined on Friday is identical to the one I proposed in November for Italy when serious policy makers were toying with the idea of letting Italy enter a Greek-style death spiral. In Italy’s case, the country is too big to fail. Anyone who has tried running through Italian default scenarios understands immediately that Italian default equals a global Depression. This is why questioning Italy’s solvency leads inevitably to monetisation. The ECB has now stepped in and monetised the debt and will continue to do so.

Before we continue to Greece, I do want to flag something about the Italian situation that I wrote when explaining the monetisation route we are on in November.

Italy’s problem is this: Italian government debt is almost 120 percent of GDP, behind only Greece within the euro area. Meanwhile, Italy pays 6.5% for its long-term debt. If interest rates were to remain at current levels for an extended period, Italy would need to run a primary budget surplus (excluding interest payments) of about 5 percent of GDP, merely to keep its debt ratio constant.

As a reminder, the plan is to have Greece’s private sector creditors reduce their claims enough to get Greece to this level, which the EU is calling sustainable. My suspicion is that the 120% debt target for Greece is largely a function of not wanting to suggest that Italy’s debt levels are too high.

That last bolded sentence is the key one. It tells you that Italy’s is a question not just of liquidity but solvency as well. For the time being, the solvency issue has been laid to rest by the ECB’s intervention. However, the euro zone is on a very pro-cyclical fiscal course. And this decreases GDP without any obvious growth offset, meaning that deficits will continue and Italy’s debt burden will grow under the current EU policy framework. It is highly likely that the solvency question for Italy will again become acute very soon.

It was refreshing to see Wolfgang Münchau reach similar conclusions in his recent piece in the Financial Times. He writes:

for argument’s sake, let us assume that Mr Samaras will stick to the programme and that a debt trap can be avoided. Everything works as officially planned. Would that be the end of the Greek crisis? In that case the Greek debt-to-GDP ratio would fall from over 160 per cent today to about 120 per cent of GDP by the end of the decade.

But this will still be far too much. We should remember that 120 per cent is a political number that lacks economic justification. It is no coincidence that this happens to be the current Italian debt-to-GDP ratio. If one admitted that 120 per cent was not sustainable for Greece, one might create a presumption that the same was true for Italy.

Why Greece and Portugal ought to go bankrupt

However, Wolfgang’s conclusion from this is the same as mine: Greece and Italy are different. Italy is a country with a primary surplus and a dynamic export base. It has a real shot at reducing its government debt levels in a less pro-cyclical fiscal environment. On the other hand, Greece not only lacks basic economic infrastructure on things like taxation to raise the revenue that would reduce the debt quickly, unlike Italy, Greece has been running a primary budget deficit across the business cycle. It is clear to everyone then that cutting expenditure and raising revenue poses a real challenge that Greece cannot meet. In Greece’s case 120% debt to GDP is still too high. Wolfgang concludes that a cut to 60% of GDP in the case of Greece (and Portugal) is the only way to give them a fighting chance. He says do it now because waiting two years would be "ruinous" as the riot scenes in Greece right now make clear.

Even so, Greece will have to exit the euro zone. Here’s why:

The Maastricht Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty clearly state that the goal is to “ensure closer coordination of economic policies and sustained convergence of the economic performances of the Member States”. This convergence has not come to pass and so now we are in a major crisis. It is becoming increasingly clear that convergence will never happen. The euro zone is unworkable. It needs tighter fiscal integration to succeed and it can’t have that unless it gets convergence. The Europeans are starting to recognize this and so breakup is now inevitable.

Euro zone breakup is inevitable

Unless you have true fiscal integration and convergence, Greece will continue to run current account and budget deficits even after the initial cut is made. So the problems we see now are endemic and they will re-occur. Marshall Auerback gets at why in a post at New Economic Perspectives on why "A Default is a Better Outcome Than the Deal on Offer."

He writes:

Greece is a hopelessly uncompetitive economy that probably shouldn’t be in the euro zone. But can you surgically detach Greece if it defaults, without some sort of impact on the entire euro payments system?

And what will the impact be on Greece itself? The country currently runs a primary budget deficit (excluding interest payments on debt) of around 5% of GDP. Were it to default, Athens would be forced to go cold turkey ("cold Greece"?) until the primary fiscal deficit (now around 5% of GDP) is balanced. Maybe the government could suspend all military expenditures as a first pass? At the very least, they can stop buying German military equipment!

No question, that under a default, a lot of public sector employees will be sacked, pensions will be at risk, and unemployment will almost certainly go higher. But that is certainly going to occur under the deal now being struck.

Convergence between eastern and western Germany took twenty years after true fiscal and political integration and trillions of dollars in investment and solidarity taxes. That’s the kind of hard slog and commitment we are talking about here. Politically, this won’t happen. So, plans for Greece to exit will become the default scenario.

Marshall writes what the benefits of that exit would be:

Were the country to revert to the drachma, however, they would likely be left with a substantially weaker currency, which could ultimately provide the country with the wherewithal to compete in the global economy. With a super-cheap exchange rate, Greece could become a Mecca for retirement homes, research hospitals, trans-European liberal arts colleges, and maybe low-overhead software startups. Plus, a permanent home for the Olympics. It could live happily ever after, as Florida does, on the pension income of the elderly and the beer money of the young.

This would be the source of the foreign transfers that the private banking sector won’t make anymore. In Greece’s case that credit went to the public sector and a lot of it built useful infrastructure, so it’s not a waste, but the first step is surely to cancel the debts and stop the illusion that they can be paid. And it would end the "death by 1000 cuts" currently being imposed on the Troika, which will serve no useful economic, political or social purpose.

Of course, there will be a slew of defaults and an endless series of court cases, litigation, etc., much as there was when Argentina defaulted in 2001. But it would force the issue of debt restructuring on the table in a meaningful way and at least provide Greece with light at the end of the tunnel.

Now, the problem is getting from here to there. Likely this will mean state coercion to drive out other media of exchange, to prevent inflation spiralling out of control, and to minimise capital flight. Unfortunately, you can’t get from here to there without these factors. If someone can give me a plausible scenario that doesn’t involve capital controls, bank account conversions and so on, I’m all ears.

I outlined my seven-step Italian framework from November for Greece on Friday. This does not consider the bank solvency question, which is another separate issue:

  1. Plan. The Greek government can plan for a redenomination into New Drachma in secret that takes advantage of the Greek law jurisdiction over their sovereign debt obligations.
  2. Law. “Euroization” would remain in place and the euro would continue as the currency of physical payment. However, New Drachma would become the national currency.
  3. Taxes. The government would announce that henceforth it will tax exclusively in New Drachma. All municipal governments would be required by law to tax in New Drachma.
  4. Banks. The Greek government would (coercively) convert all euro bank accounts legally into New Drachma. The systems would process as if it were euros because of the fixed peg, but legally the money would be New Drachma. This would make the Greek economy “euroized” but make the banking system redenominated into New Drachma.
  5. Retail. Retailers, all sellers of Greek goods, would then be forced to return to the double accounting treatment of pre-2002 whereby they denominate all transactions in both Drachma and Euros. Paper money would be euros. The electronic money would legally be New Drachma, even while the systems said euro.
  6. Float. On day one, immediately after redominating, the Greek government would drop the New Drachma exchange rate peg and float.
  7. Physical currency. New Drachma would be printed by the Bank of Greece and introduced to replace euros.

Here’s why this proposal works: The forcible conversion of government bonds into New Drachma means at once that the government no longer has any default risk since all IOUs are in local currency which it could manufacture if necessary. The risk then becomes currency risk. As I wrote in Bond vigilantes and the currency relief valve:

So the currency gives way, not interest rates. And to the degree that interest rates would increase, the central bank can print. The currency revulsion question then is always currency depreciation, inflation and even hyperinflation (when and under what preconditions) not interest rate spikes.

The point then is to get the benefits of a floating currency but to mitigate inflation risks by instantly giving demand to the new Drachma by making all government taxes payable in Drachma. The New Drachma will be heavily depreciated and that will cause the price level to rise, which amounts to an instantaneous lowering of living standards. But if the currency can be stabilised then after this initial period, the devaluation doesn’t have to be inflationary. Iceland’s 2009 devaluation and capital controls is a guide here. In Argentina’s default, state coercion in the form of re-denominating non-Peso bank deposits helped. I remember being aghast at this theft at the time. But the reality is the state will want to drive out the use of all other media of exchange and so will be forced to do this with New Drachma as well. And forcing retail transactions into New Drachma entrenches the currency as a medium of exchange. Clearly Marshall’s comments about getting better tax enforcement, by for instance taxing property instead of income, are key to making demand for New Drachma enough for the scheme to be successful.

To ensure some sort of viability of the drachma, the Greek government would have to find a more credible means of ensuring tax compliance. Most Greeks with money have presumably already moved it beyond the reach of the Greek banking system, so that savings would not be wiped out. As the tide of repossessions begins, many of these oligarchs would likely start to buy back the Greek assets on the cheap, as it is doubtful that the euro banks will want anything to with them.

Beyond that, it would be important for Athens to establish a new tax system that minimises tax evasion, so as to create demand for the new drachma immediately, and mitigate the formation of an extensive parallel transactions currency. After all, it is possible that many Greeks might prefer to use the existing stock of euros in the country and there is very little the EU authorities could do to stop this (much as the US government could not prevent Panama from dollarising its economy). But in order to establish a long-lasting demand for drachmas, two things would have to happen:

  1. The Greek government would announce that it will begin taxing exclusively in the new currency.
  2. The Greek government would announce that it will make all payments in the new currency.

Given the country’s history of tax evasion on income tax, a national real estate tax would likely work better than a new income tax.

(See here for more details:)

Once all of these issues are taken care of, the demand for the currency should be sufficient and at that point all that would be left is to print the new currency.

The fact that Willem Buiter’s proposal at Citigroup is very similar to mine tells you that this is the kind of outline other euro watchers are going to come up with. His points on EU exit and capital flight are key. I agree with all of his points except the one on a currency peg. Greece is not competitive in a currency union with Germany and would suffer the problems with a peg.

Business Insider outlines Buiter this way:

  1. Grexit will only happen when Greece publicly flouts troika recommendations and has no chance of receiving aid.
  2. Greece will pass a currency law setting exchange rates and limiting those who can file suits against the Greek government in foreign courts.
  3. It will simultaneously impose strict capital controls to prevent capital flight.
  4. Greece could pursue a currency peg, but probably not for a few years.
  5. Greece might also decide to exit the European Union, but probably wouldn’t if it defaulted because the ECB wouldn’t give it money.A credit event would occur, provoking CDS payouts, though its timing could vary.
  6. The New Drachma would sharply devalue.
  7. The value of the euro would probably decline, probably by about 10%.
  8. While foreign banks and financial entities will take losses in the event of a Grexit, they will be manageable.
  9. Given Greece’s limited size, it’s likely to have little impact on trade, even to its closest trading partners.
  10. EU leaders would likely take strong action to prevent contagion.
  11. However, this support is not likely to be unconditional or unlimited.
  12. Regardless, there are lots of options left to maintain stability.

In conclusion, a Greek exit from the euro zone would be traumatic and the potential for serious policy errors exist. However, Greece’s fiscal path is not sustainable as part of a currency union dedicated to a strong currency and immediate fiscal balance, even with a haircut that takes government debt to GDP down to 120%. Moreover, even with Greece fulfilling the Maastricht criteria after a haircut down to 60% government debt to GDP that includes ECB (public sector) involvement, the lack of euro zone convergence means these problems will arise again. Greece is simply not competitive as part of a currency union with Germany – and it never will be. That means almost permanent fiscal transfers and a loss of Greek fiscal sovereignty. The political will necessary to support this solution does not exist. And so Greece will exit the euro zone. I have just outlined what I think is a good way for this exit to be executed.

  1. Dave Holden says

    Greece would also benefit in that it is a major tourist destination.

    1. Edward Harrison says

      100%. Marshall gives that take when he writes “It could live happily ever after, as Florida does, on the pension income of the elderly and the beer money of the young.”

      A competitive currency devaluation would help this.

      1. Dave Holden says

        Ah right, I didn’t get the Florida reference.

      2. David Lazarus says

        Yes but that will require the removal of the Greeks to keep house prices low enough to attract pensioners. Don’t forget that they buy homes creating bubbles and do not really add much to the local economy, they will be on fixed incomes funded by annuities backed by very low rate bonds, so their incomes will be pitiful anyway. You only have to see the impact on UK annuities and pensions to see that is a non starter. Then they will probably only buy the basics and rely on early bird specials to cope. It will be the rich retirees that you want and they will already have homes in Monaco and other tax havens.

  2. Matt says

    Not gonna happen, EU wont allow it and it will be more expensive then the alternative of staying in the EU.

  3. Dave says

    Next question: when?

  4. Evangelos says

    Greece gave up its currency in 2001,that means that Greece have to print a hell of money instantly,I doubt if that can happen in secret underground basements,and the current PM is a former ECB member so will try to do so.

    If Greece decides/forced to exit at last,maybe (not sure about that) one should not expect bonds to be paid at any currency.Starting from scratch makes sense when really starting from scratch, having a huge euro-dept is not a good way to start!

    Major problem is that any new currency will simply have no value,a currency that no one will want to get instead of euros.

    1. Dew Puckett says

      Greece is “cash in hand” economy already. So I do agree that a Euro cash economy will persist, as greeks will hoard Euros. Much like the dollar bill is the defacto currency in many parts of africa. No one will want to hold the new currency, even the greeks.

      1. Edward Harrison says

        I am confident that having all government entities at the national and local level transacting only in New Drachma, bank accounts converted to New Drachma, and retail transactions mandated to be conducted in New Drachma will be sufficient to entrench the currency.

        Sure people will use the euro on the sly but official transactions will all be in the new currency. The key is to stop inflation dead in its tracks by raising enough taxes. That will give the currency support after the euro default, euro exit and initial devaluation. The Greeks need to have a robust tax regime and move toward full employment.

  5. djellal says

    Greece need to leave EuroZ. But I think that Germany will leave before. Today Germany don’t need UE, but only bolkenstein. China is passed now front of france as german’ client.

  6. David Lazarus says

    I cannot believe how wrong Marshall is. Greece a mecca for retirees? You only have to look at Florida and Spain to see how badly that ended. The incoming retirees drive up house costs and drive out the locals. So in Florida you had a spectacular property bubble funded in part by retirees. In Spain you have the same effect and it has driven out the locals, moving inland, for the same reason. In fact it is so bad that means that other services such as schools suffer significantly as young families exit the area because homes are too expensive for young locals. It also drives out other businesses who want a younger demographic. Then add in the extra costs of elderly who have insufficient health insurance, which will be most, and those burdens fall on the local and national Greek governments. Then as a mecca for the young well that also has externalities that Marshall has failed to consider. Too many youngsters and beer means trouble and that means more police are needed, who will pay for them?

    I like the idea of a permanent home for the Olympics but that will never happen considering the corruption around getting the games. Too much loose cash to stop that ever happening and too much prestige for some tin pot dictatorship to bribe enough delegates to get it in their country.

    Also a mecca for start ups and research? While Greeks are very highly educated the problem is that austerity will destroy its infrastructure before they see the gains of any investment. There will be no road repairs or port or airport modernisation with austerity and no prospects of growth for a private investor to take a chance. The problem will be that as this process is dragged out the young will leave and the prospects for any new businesses will seriously impaired, as the demographics shift as in Ireland and the Baltic states.

    I do see the problem with trying to cut the deficit to 120% by 2020. It will still be too high and all this depends on growth, but where is this growth coming from. So there will be default after default until the debts are manageable. I suspect that outside the euro and without EU support the level of sustainable debt will be close to zero, especially since the ability to tax is being destroyed by current policy. That will mean things are going to get a lot worse for Spain and Italy as well as the core. Then we have to allow for the possibility of a coup and a new military junta declaring all euro debts illegal and defaulting. The Troika are playing poker with the stability of Greece at stake and I do not think that they have a clue what they are doing.

    The problem is that the latest plan might be approved but the Greek citizenry just exit the official economy, and survive in a black economy, without taxes, and then the finances for the Greeks will just deteriorate to the point of collapse.

    I do think that the conversion to a new drachma has merits but there will need to be capital controls introduced, as rich greeks try and turn a profit on their euro holdings as they convert them to drachma. Economists have not even considered the impact on Greece from that aspect. I think that within the other periphery nations that they will have to start preparing for worse to come.

    Italy would be a bigger problem because if austerity causes the same problems as in Greece then you could see the resurgence of crime especially in the south as a way of coping.

    I do agree with you that there will be massive potential for policy errors but many have been made already it is just that they do not realise it. Longer term I see this casting significant doubt on the sustainability of the euro and even bringing about a collapse of the EU itself.

    1. Oz says

      David, I don’t think you’re totally wrong in worrying about the implications of massive foreign investment in Greece from retirees, tourists etc. I think the point Marshall and others (including me) are trying to make is that Greece’s exit from the Euro would not be the end of the world that many assume. Right now, I’m sure the Greeks would love the “problem” of a booming economy and overloaded infrastructure caused by foreigners voluntarily spending piles of money in Greece! If they get their act together (reforming taxes etc) they can easily handle an influx of cashed-up foreigners

  7. carmelo cortes says

    Ive been following your ideas about these scenarios being laid out. The problem with the exit from eurozone is that I hardly see these politicians being able to carry it out. Greek governments have been out of control since its existence, these people is used to live at the expense of the government subsidies, yes I agree that tourism can help a lot but certainly it will be a terrible handicap for Spain and Italy which depend a lot on tourism.

    1. Edward Harrison says

      I hear you Carmelo. There aren’t a lot of good options for the euro zone right now. It’s really about minimising the potential for catastrophically bad outcomes at this point.

      Greece has lost all credibility on the fiscal front so there is no situation in which it will benefit politically from increased transfer payments unless it goes through harsh austerity. And this is a situation which is reaching its breaking point domestically.

      I wish there was a good option here.

  8. Evangelos says

    When we (Greece) entered the euro-zone,there were strict limitations for the agricultural production and European subsidies for those who were allowed to cultivate (usually political persons or indirectly connected with politicians). That destroyed our agricultural productivity base,rest of the job was done with the Chinese products which overflowed the universe.

    Then came the -never ending- military equipment large buys from USA/Germany/France (with that buys their governments fully corrupted our politicians),and the huge spending for public medicare (playground for trained crooks like Siemens,Johnson & Johnson etc. since there were no adequate control-spending procedures,only ancient bureaucracy procedures).

    The whole euro thing was very good for -suprise!-Germany and generally the South Europe,but for the rest of us its a story with no happy end.

    Moral of this story is coming from Troy:
    Beware of Europeans bearing subsidies.

  9. HK says

    Just an observation on the (unfortunate) difference between Italy and Greece.

    Italy has already an enormous fiscal pressure. Such a pressure that any attempt to increase taxes leads now to far less consumption. The car market has retreated in January by 16%…


  10. SM says

    The Conundrum: Greece leaving the Euro Zone is unbearable, yet staying is untenable.

  11. ChrisBern says

    The question I have is who are the suckers who still have money sitting in Greek banks?

  12. Ascanio Salvidio says

    Mr. Harrison, you write:

    1) Italy is too big to fail. Failure would lead to a global depression; 2) In a less pro-cyclical fiscal environment, Italy has a good chance to reduce its government debt

    My comment:

    Your assumptions clearly imply that, contrary to Greece (and possibly Portugal) in Italy’s case an agreed, moderated debt write down (act now !) would produce effective recovery results, since the country’s production system remains still competitive. Such a controlled and agreed write down would enable to “plan depression” and accelerate subsequent recovery. I see it as a far better chance for global economy than taking the risk that the “to big to fail theory” may be reveal itself nothing more than a merciful wish. Moreover signs are growing that Italian people dispise (as they never before 1943 did) the parasytic leadership that has lead a once renowned country for its beauty, pleasant lifestile and vivid economy into a secular disaster. Under such circumstances all bets are open.

    Kind regards

  13. joey says

    “The Greeks need to have a robust tax regime and move toward full employment(taxed).”

    That is the crux of the problem here. Tax support for a cash in hand economy? The only way I can see support is with creative accounting.

    We need to be honest about how this could play out, as soon as there is the slightest whiff of a new drachma there is going to be massive capital flight. The new Drachma is going to undergo a massive devaluation, tax receipts will dry up, the euro will become the defacto currency of the cash economy.
    The scenario outlined above could conceivably work for the Irish economy, but not the Greek one as it stands.

    Tax reform first, rewards for turning in tax dodgers, debit/credit cards for purchases over 20 euros.
    Before a New Drachma, it must have solid support.
    That support needs to be there before the currency is introduced.

    1. Edward Harrison says

      Nonsense. It never works that way. Look at any of the European countries that introduced their currencies after World War II. Look at the German currency post hyperinflation. You obviously are just saying what your gut tells you rather than looking to historical examples because what you are saying is not borne out by history at all.

      1. Blackeyebart says

        It always works that way. I cannot find a single example in history of a strong currency being replaced by a weak one. Perhaps you can?

        Especially as the weak currency is being introduced so it can be devalued.

        The German Mark was introduced successfully because it appeared (correctly) to be stronger than the currency it replaced. It is an example making my point rather than yours.

        If the Greek Government can force banks to convert all bank balances to a currency worth, say 25% less then it can cut all bank balances by 25% and leave than in Euro.

        Whats the difference?

  14. Matt says

    Greece cant leave the EU, it makes more sense to stay in. Even with German creditor overlords, better then being a backwater whos currency on one will accept. Why would you as a creditor accept a currency whos sole purpose for existance is to devalue itself. It simply wont happne. Its more likely a better transfer of payments system is implemented. Look, we have the same problem in the US, we just balance payments. NY pays for the South, Cali pays for the midwest, etc, etc….

  15. David Edenden says


    Based on my knowledge of 1st and 2nd year micro and macro economics and based on the assumption of widespread tax evasion in Greece as the major problem in addition to over spending.

    Would it have been “technically” feasible to pass one law taking over 50% of the equity of everyone’s home, apartment, building and farm property under the assumption that the correct taxes were not paid. the individuals would then pay back the government as a mortgage. For those who cannot pay, the amount would be added to their mortgage.

    The rich would have to pay their fair share. Everyone (I really mean everyone) would be hit at the same time and a rough fairness would ensue.

    There would have been no need to raise anyone’s taxes, but the unemployed, military and pensioners could have been “drafted” to work at collecting existing taxes.

    A lien on property would ensure that no one could dodge measure and the EU would know where the promised money is coming from.

    “Technically”, is this feasible? Is 50% too low, to high or just right.

  16. Leverage says

    Steep 4-to-6, drachmas will sell at a discount even if they are pegged. Maybe could not really be a problem, but what I’m saying is that the market will force exchange price before authorities on the new currency even if its through black market practices when people starts to change their accounts in drachmas to real euros.

    If this is problematic or not will depend on the situation of how the industrial base and trade situation is in the nation when this happens, because it could very well end in a hyperinflation spiral if the currency its not accepted by the population and does not have real production backup after it. Right now this is improbable, but give it a couple of years of capital destruction and the probabilities will increase fast.

  17. Blackeyebart says

    It would make more sense for Greece to default than to leave the Euro.
    Default is of course illegal – in the sense that it is a contravention of the agreements entered into with other EZ states. This would give an excuse and a reason for the EZ counties to expel Greece from the EZ. The day I see Spain, Ireland, Portugal, Italy and Belgian voting to do so I will concede that the law matters more than I thought it would. Does anyone really expect that would happen?

    A default makes sense as it addresses the only part of the mess that is within the total control of the Greek Government.

    A default would need other measures to guarantee the solvency of the Greek Government going forward, but once survival was assured the markets would rally.

    It is far less complicated and risky that a new currency. It is also politically possible. Greeks will not be burning down shops in protest about the pain to “rich foreigners”

    I have considered your idea of introducing the Drachma but using the Euro for cash, until the necessary mint could be completed. As a way of creating opportunities for tax fraud it would be very successful, but it would complicate trade and freeze commerce.

    While the Euro alternative exists there is no natural floor to the value of the Drachma. Requiring taxes to be paid in Drachmas does not give it a sustaining value. Given that the value of the Drachma was falling Greeks would delay paying their taxes. The effective revenue of the Greek Government would be far less than if it had stayed in the Euro. The Drachma economy would not be viable.

    I accept that it would be “nice” if Greece could have its own currency, which could reflect the value of its economy. This would make adjustment much easier.

    That option is just not practical. Anyone who thinks it is should try to swap 75 cents for a dollar. About 350 Billion times.

    1. Edward Harrison says

      It is not about what is practical but what is politically feasible. None of this is about practicality but rather the politics of individual euro zone states.

  18. Edward Harrison says

    I am opening up this thread on How and why Greece will leave the euro zone

Comments are closed.

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