The FDIC and the socialization of banking losses
With the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) about to release its latest figures for banks it regulates and its own financial condition, now is a good time to review its role in this crisis. This post is about the FDIC’s role in the credit crisis, how it seizes banks and why I believe this matters.
In my opinion, Sheila Bair, the head of the FDIC, is the best regulator in government these days (although not everyone feels that way). Her agency has taken on the workman’s regulatory role in this crisis of identifying undercapitalized institutions, seizing them and putting their assets in new hands. These actions are a necessary part of capitalism. When a bank is reckless, it must suffer the consequences.
However, it is the distribution of the losses from failed institutions which I would like to discuss. Much of the loss falls on the FDIC and, hence, taxpayers. In effect, what is a necessary part of capitalism, the extinction of failed institutions, may in effect be a redistribution of wealth in disguise.
Last week, when I posted on Guaranty, the latest seizure by the FDIC, a reader noted that the loss-sharing agreement between BBVA, which had purchased Guaranty’s assets, and the FDIC was quite favorable for BBVA.
On its website BBVA states in Spanish:
BBVA ha suscrito con la FDIC un “loss sharing agreement”, que cubre todos los créditos adquiridos en la transacción, en virtud del cual la FDIC se haría cargo, en caso de producirse, del 80% de las primeros 2.300 millones de dólares de las posibles pérdidas, y del 95% a partir de dicho límite.
What this says is: “BBVA has signed a “loss sharing agreement” with the FDIC, covering all loans acquired in the transaction. Under that agreement the FDIC would cover 80% of the first 2.3 billion dollars of any losses that may occur, and 95% above that ceiling.”
Translation: The FDIC is on the hook for the lion’s share of any subsequent losses at Guaranty. As a taxpayer, you would be right to feel you’re not getting a good deal here because you are ultimately the one picking up the losses. How?
Socialization of losses
It works like this. Last year, when IndyMac failed, it was the event which brought the credit crisis into mainstream consciousness. Mind you, the crisis had begun in February 2007 when HSBC wrote down billions of bad debt. But, for the man on the street, it only hit home when a run on IndyMac started in July 2008 and unsecured depositors lost money.
Soon after that event, I pointed out that the FDIC couldn’t possibly bail out all the banks likely to go bust in the crisis. At the time, the FDIC had just over $50 billion in its kitty. The IndyMac bankruptcy alone was expected to cost $8 billion to the fund, a number that subsequently increased to $10.7 billion.
The losses have taken their toll. The last time the FDIC reported on its financial situation back at the end May, it said it had $13 billion as of the end of March. Now, we await a new report for the period through Jun 30. Will the FDIC report any funds at all? Is the FDIC insolvent now? We will soon find out. But, one thing is for certain: the FDIC will ask the U.S. Treasury for an enormous amount of money to pay for anticipated bank losses – hundreds of billions of dollars. And they will get it.
This is what is commonly known as the socialization of losses. So when Guaranty enters into a loss-sharing agreement with BBVA, you should realize any future losses will be paid out of funds contributed to the FDIC directly by Congress and the US taxpayer.
The FDIC as a redistribution mechanism
So, obviously, how the FDIC structures its deals to seize and dispose of assets is of great interest to everyone in the U.S. I would argue that at present, the way assets are seized and sold represents a redistribution of income from taxpayers to the acquiring entities. Let’s use the BBVA example to illustrate.
Imagine you are Sheila Bair. You have shuttered 80-odd institutions this year and you realize that 150, 200, maybe 300 more institutions could fail still. No way on earth does your organization have the manpower to deal with this avalanche of bank failures without sloughing the assets off on willing buyers. How do you entice those buyers? In a word, price.
It’s what is known as a sweetheart deal. There were a number of bidders for Guaranty including US Bank, and a private-equity consortium led by Gerald Ford which included Blackstone, Carlyle and TPG. Yet, the deal went to BBVA in a loss-share agreement that caps their exposure at 20%? I ‘d like to get in on a deal like that. If you are a private equity buyer, you’re probably chomping at the bit for more deals like this.
Granted, with visions of a V-shaped recovery on the horizon, you could be forgiven for thinking there will be no further losses. But what if there is no V-shaped recovery? Then, the American taxpayer is going to be covering a lot of losses – and that is a redistribution from taxpayers to the financial services industry.
More losses to come
I certainly believe the V-shaped recovery is unlikely. More likely, we will see a sluggish recovery. And a relapse into recession is a distinct possibility. This means more losses on toxic assets at financial institutions, more exposure for the FDIC, and, thus, more socialization of losses.
Update: The FDIC approved a final statement of policy concerning acquisition of failed institutions which eased rules for private equity buyers. Obviously, the FDIC wants more bidders at the table as I have suggested in this article.
The question is whether the loss-share agreements it is crafting with those bidders will expose the agency to losses which it cannot possibly repay without taxpayer monies. As it stands now, the FDIC merely has a line of credit from the Treasury for $500 billion. However, if losses are large, I doubt very seriously those funds will be repaid.
If I’m not mistaken, the FDIC has to date funded the losses on bank seizures through the reserves it accumulated from bank assessments. It is likely that they will have to tap the Treasury for upcoming losses but I believe that comes via a $500 billion line of credit for which they are charged.
I think they are contemplating an increase in bank assessments to cover future losses as well as repay their borrowings. If all of that is true then it isn’t unreasonable to postulate that there might be no negative effect on the taxpayer at all.
Let me know if I have my facts wrong.
The $500 billion is the question. Will this money ultimately come from taxpayers or the banks themselves via higher insurance premia in the future? I am saying that it will be a taxpayer-financed recapitalization of the FDIC.
Are you saying you believe the FDIC is going to pay the money it draws down on its line of credit via money it earns from the banks?
Another pertinent question is: will the money be repaid? If you think it will, you have a lot more faith in government than I.
I appreciate your skepticism and generally share it with regard to government, however, historically the FDIC is one of those rare exceptions to the rule.
The last time the FDIC had to come hat in hand to the government was in 1990 when it exhausted its reserve. It borrowed $15 billion and repaid the money next year. Though that recession does not match this one in terms of severity, as a banking crisis it is certainly on a par.
I don’t think it’s unreasonable to assume that history could repeat itself in this case.
I’ll wait until the dust has settled. In the meantime, we can all see that BBVA is getting a good deal. At a minimum, you are taking losses that the acquiring entity, in this case BBVA, would have to pay and spreading it out to the banking system as a whole via increased premia.
And I certainly do NOT think our undercapitalized banks can afford to pay $500 billion in additional premia. $15 billion in 1990, yes. hundreds of billions in losses in 2009-2011, no. You have to think this will fall on taxpayers. The losses are too large.
Any thoughts on this article?:
By softening its stance on private equity, the F.D.I.C. is hoping to turn up additional buyers and reduce the number of failed banks that its insurance fund will have to support. But the new rules may fall short in encouraging a flood of participation.
It seems in line with what I am suggesting the FDIC wants to do.
Here’s what I wrote today https://www.butthenwhat.com/?p=6227 and this
is a link to the first article of several that I wrote on the subject
https://www.butthenwhat.com/?p=4108. That last link also contains a
link to a very good post that John Hempton did on the subject.
I see today’s action as a desperation move simply because they’re
afraid of running out of bidders for what they know they have to pick
up. I don’t deny your assertion that the FDIC is or will be squeezed
for money, but I still maintain over time that the taxpayer won’t take
it in the shorts. They will eventually be able to pay off their credit
lines from the insurance premiums they pick up from the banks.
I think the real story is opening up banking to commercial ownership.
This was wiped out for good reason in the banking reforms of the
1930’s and here we go again.
I’d agree that this is significant. I had already been a bit leery after the BankUnited deal. Ultimately, what choice does the FDIC have? Either they staff up and essentially own the banks for a longer period or they pawn the assets off for a song to PE bidders.
I would say that the enticement of commercial bidders, the lack of stomach/staff to own these assets and my contention that the FDIC will see large losses from the transaction are inter-related. I is the need to find viable bidders which creates a problem for the FDIC.
This will only get worse as time goes on because there are only so many bidders available. To my mind, the real story is that the FDIC is forced into a position of weakness vis-a-vis commercial bidders because of an unwillingness to ‘nationalize’ i.e. have an RTC-like or equivalent resolution scheme.
This is why they HAVE to open the process up to commercial bidders to begin with.
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