Financial reform now being considered would not have prevented the crisis
Marshall Auerback here.
Neither the Dodd Bill, nor the House version, will do much to prevent the abuses described in the SEC’s lawsuit against Goldman Sachs. Senator Dodd himself acknowledged this fact. Additionally, as Frank Partnoy has pointed out in a recent Financial Times piece, the legislation, as currently drafted, would do nothing about recently publicised accounting abuses at Lehman Brothers and other banks.
The banks’ inaccurate financial statements have generated howls of protest but no successful litigation. As a long time market practitioner who believes in well functioning free markets, I also view with alarm the development of a variant of crony capitalism and "heads I win, tails you lose" casino speculation that represents "finance" on Wall Street today. Like Partnoy, I also believe that Congress could and should use the threat of litigation to reform derivatives and off-balance sheet transactions.
Below is a letter to Congress which I have co-signed.
April 14, 2010
The Honorable Harry Reid The Honorable Mitch McConnell
United States Senate United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510 Washington, DC 20510
Dear Senators Reid and McConnell:
Nineteen months after the most devastating financial crisis since the Great Depression, our financial system remains at risk. Neither the bill passed earlier this year by the House, nor the one currently under consideration in the Senate would have prevented the crisis. Without serious restructuring, they will not prevent a future crisis.
Sound financial markets are the bedrock of a strong economy. Over the last decade, under both Democratic and Republican leadership, our financial sector moved away from core market principles – transparency, competition, free flow of information and the essential discipline of failure – that allowed the US economy to thrive. Restoring the integrity of our financial markets and providing the foundation for economic recovery, requires re-committing to these principles.
We, the undersigned, call on you to fulfill the responsibilities of your position by joining together in non-partisan cooperation to pass legislation that AT A MINIMUM would have prevented the crisis we just endured. Such legislation must include ALL of the following reforms or be considered incomplete:
- Eliminates a perpetual system of government sponsored corporate bailouts financed by the government or private industry.
- Increase minimum capital requirements for banks to no less than 8%. Apply additional risk-weighted capital requirements for: a) risk concentration, b) significant interconnectedness with other financial institutions and c) illiquidity which assumes a decline in collateral values. Create standard metrics for these variables.
- Require on balance sheet reporting of all liabilities with disclosure of related material information including all contingent claims (including but not limited to swaps, SIVs and VIEs). Provide a private right of action for failure to comply and for knowingly aiding and abetting securities fraud.
- Require all standardized derivatives to be traded over exchanges and central clearinghouses with pricing transparent to market participants include a strong presumption that most existing OTC transactions would be standardized. Require all inter-bank and inter-dealer contingent claims (including but not limited to derivative and swap transactions) that cannot be standardized to be reported on a daily basis to a regulated transparent clearinghouse. Mandate significant and consistent margin and regulatory requirements across standardized and OTC contingent claim transactions.
- Create standardized Pooling and Servicing Agreements and mandate the timely availability of electronically usable loan level information for asset backed securities,covered bond and similarly structured transactions prior to sale. Provide a private right of action and personal liability for sponsors of securitized underwritings.
- Establish a timeline for the resolution of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
- Mandate that credit rating agencies be subject to the same legal standards as other market participants.
- Mandate a separation of the roles of Chairman of the Board and CEO for regulated financial institutions.
Without these reforms, our economy remains at risk.
We would like to meet with you at your earliest convenience to discuss these concerns.
Sincerely,
Marcellus Andrews
Barnard College
Marshall Auerback
Senior Fellow, the Roosevelt Institute
Global Portfolio Strategist, RAB Capital
Dean Baker
Co-director, Center for Economic and Policy Research
Dan Berger
Managing Principal, Berger & Montague, PC
William Black
Associate Professor of Economics and Law, University of Missouri-Kansas City
Former senior financial regulator
Margaret Cannella
Former Managing Director and Global Head of Credit Research and U.S. Corporate Strategy, JPMorgan
Timothy A. Canova
Betty Hutton Williams Professor of International Economic Law, Chapman University School of Law
Jim Chanos
Founder and President, Kynikos Associates
Bowman Cutter
Senior Fellow, the Roosevelt Institute
Former Managing Director, Warburg Pincus
Raj Date
Chairman and Executive Director, Cambridge Winter Center
Barry Eichengreen
Department of Economics, University of California
Thomas Ferguson
Professor of Political Science, University of Massachusetts, Boston
Senior Fellow, the Roosevelt Institute
Jerome S. Fons
Advisor, K2 Global Partners
Former Managing Director, Moody’s Investors Service
Michael Greenberger
Law School Professor, University of Maryland School of Law
Former CFTC division director
Teresa Ghilarducci
Schwartz Professor of Economic Analysis, the New School University
Geoffrey Heal
Paul Garrett Professor of Public Policy and Corporate Responsibility, Columbia Business School
Leo Hindery
Chairman, the US Economy/Smart Globalization Initiative, New America Foundation
Arjun Jayadev
Fellow, Roosevelt Institute
University of Massachusetts, Boston
Rob Johnson
Senior Fellow and Director of the Project on Global Finance, the Roosevelt Institute
Former Chief Economist, Senate Banking Committee
Ethan Kaplan
Columbia University
Mike Konczal
Fellow, the Roosevelt Institute
Jan Kregel
Levy Economics Institute of Bard College
Robert Kuttner
Former Chief Investigator, Senate Banking Committee
Co-editor, the American Prospect
Henry C K Liu
Chairman, Liu Investment Group
Dariush P. Maanavi
Former Managing Director and Head of Corporate Equity Derivatives, Merrill Lynch
Jeff Madrick
Senior Fellow, the Roosevelt Institute
Editor, Challenge Magazine
Jamie Mai
Founder and President, Cornwall Capital
Frank Partnoy
Professor of Law and Finance, University of San Diego
Robert E. Prasch
Professor of Economics, Department of Economics, Middlebury College
Robert Reich
Professor of Public Policy, Goldman School of Public Policy, University of California Berkeley
Former U.S. Secretary of Labor
Josh Rosner
Managing Director, Graham Fisher & Co
Peter Solomon
Founder and Chairman, Peter J Solomon Company
Walker F. Todd
Attorney and economist
Former legal and research officer, Federal Reserve Banks of New York and Cleveland
Lynn Turner
Former Chief Accountant, Securities and Exchange Commission
Lawrence J. White
Professor of Economics, Stern School of Business, New York University
Randall Wray
Levy Economics Institute, Bard College
What keeps total market risk from redlining? Is it the requirement for risk-weighted capital reserves? Banks will stop taking on risk because reserve requirements will become too much of a burden? Will that be enough to keep overall market risk down, or are you only addressing the bank portion of the problem?