Cautiously Optimistic Into 2011
It’s high time I laid my cards on the table about 2011. I have hinted around my view in previous posts, promising to spell it out in detail. So, here it is: I am cautiously optimistic on the US and global economy for 2011. Let me explain both pieces of the puzzle – the cautious part and the optimistic part – below. I’ll start with the positive first.
Optimistic
Double dip recessions are not the norm; they are the exception. Why? Here’s how I put it in September:
Recoveries by definition start from a point of diminished output because recessions are periods of diminishing output. So output in the initial period of any recovery is always lower. That’s how the math works – and also why I continue to stress that this is a technical recovery.
But, the important part to remember is how the business cycle works and how the recency effect creates self-reinforcing declines or recoveries in output.
Increases in income lead to increases in retail sales which lead to increases in output and inventories which lead to more jobs and thus a further increase in income. This is a virtuous circle that defines the upward path of a business cycle.
So, you really need to see powerful secular forces to overcome this self-reinforcing dynamic. Once a technical recovery begins, we should expect it to continue and blossom into a full-blown cyclical recovery. Obviously, I am talking about the medium-term, not the long-term here. But the point is that we have been in recovery for over one-and-a-half years in the US. Odds are that this will continue for some time to come (through 2011 at least).
I see the jobs picture as encouraging. Employment is lagging as it has in the last two recoveries. So the recovery looks particularly weak. Moreover, there seems to be a skew toward the upper income strata. This makes the technical recovery appear even more sluggish. But clearly, the jobs picture is improving.
What are US jobless claims telling us about recovery? They are averaging about 410,000, down from almost 470,000 a year ago. And since employment is a lagging indicator, we should expect claims to drop even further as GDP has been growing.
Across the board, the economic indicators show a modest but improving economic picture: industrial production, capacity utilization, personal income, retail sales. And I expect this to continue through at least the first half of 2011, probably through the whole year.
Cautious
I am cautious about this outlook because I still believe the US is in a cyclical upturn within a larger depression. The concept that the structural problems of excessive household indebtedness and an over-reliance on financial services and housing can be solved by money printing and fiscal stimulus leaves me cold. My thesis is that these remedies mask problems only due to the cyclical upturn. If the recovery is not used to whittle the problem away, the next recession will be as bad or worse than the last.
That said, policy makers have done a pretty good job of avoiding egregious policy errors so far. I think that gives us enough oomph to get over the hump so the cyclical agents like inventories and cyclical hiring can do their magic. But, here are my lingering concerns.
- Europe: the sovereign debt crisis refuses to go away. The European periphery is hurting but the crisis has infected the core via Belgium and Italy. I expect the crisis to get worse before decisive action is taken because that’s how politicians usually respond. There are three options for the euro zone: monetisation, default, or break-up. The question is whether this – in and of itself – deals a fatal blow to recovery in Europe, infecting the global economy. If you had asked me this question early last year, I would have said yes. Today, one year more into a cyclical recovery, it is less clear.
- US states and municipalities: Meredith Whitney has put this crisis front and center. My take is similar to the one on Europe: The question is whether this – in and of itself – deals a fatal blow to recovery in the US, infecting the global economy. Here, I have always felt that the budget issues would only become dire in a cyclical downturn as declining asset prices created public sector pension losses. In an upturn, tax revenue increases as do accounting gains from asset prices. Costs for supporting the unemployed decrease. To the degree there are budget problems, the situation is very pro-cyclical – meaning you have what MBA’s call a high degree of operating leverage on municipal and state income statements. Leverage works to magnify cyclical ups and downs. That means that, while I agree with Whitney’s alarm on munis, I do not think this is a 2011 event.
- Housing: House price declines have resumed in the UK and the US. They never stopped in Ireland and Spain. The housing double dip is in progress. Complicating matters, clearly, fraud was a big issue not only in the origination of mortgage loans in the US but also in packaging and foreclosure. There is a real possibility that a systemic legal problem develops on that front in 2011. I don’t know how this problem will be resolved. At this point, I see it as the biggest near-term risk for the U.S. in 2011.
- Currency Wars: a lot of good is done simply by having economic growth. It takes a lot of political heat off politicians. The currency wars are really a political event because they are caused by a lack of aggregate demand. When the pie shrinks, individual countries feel obliged to implement beggar-thy-neighbour policies to maintain their standards of living by taking a larger share of the pie. The developed economies have felt this ‘pie shrinkage’ most acutely. So it is they who are driving the so-called currency wars forward. The emerging markets are merely reacting in kind. I say "First the rate reductions, then money printing, then the currency war, then the tariffs, then…. hopefully economic recovery. But, as with the other problems, unless recovery is used to solve the issue of external imbalances created by our jury-rigged monetary system, the so-called Bretton Woods II, then tensions will return worse than before when recession hits. Only after a full-blown crisis will the underlying issues be addressed. So, wait for the next crisis for reform of the monetary system.
- UPDATE: Added this paragraph – Commodity price Inflation: There is a real threat to recovery from commodity price inflation. We have already begun to see signs of food price riots, food price controls and the like in emerging markets. Additionally, Brent crude is at 27-month highs, closing in on $100 a barrel. Just think back to 2008; this type of commodity price inflation was toxic and sowed the seeds of its on demand destruction.
Conclusions
I may write what I think this means for stocks or bonds in another post. But the quick data dump is that profit margins are cyclically high while P/E ratios are above their long-term levels. If firms staff up, we could see a modest rise in stocks due to an increase in aggregate demand, despite these two factors. Personally, I tend to like large cap value and I think that’s the right call for this environment because, while I am optimistic, I am cautious. On bonds, I have been saying for four months that they showed a poor risk/reward skew at these levels. Moreover, duration changes are pretty large when yields are low. That means you can sustain heavy losses if yields tick up. There is no reason to be a hero by moving out the curve and getting long duration. Nor is there any reason to load up on risk, especially in munis and sovereign debt. That is still my view. But US sovereign debt is a lot more attractive today than it was four months ago.
On the economic front, I moved away from a multi-year recovery baseline because of the prospect of policy errors. We avoided those errors in 2010. With the technical recovery poised to become a full-blown cyclical recovery, I think it’s time to move back to the multi-year recovery baseline. Let me repeat my oft quoted phrase about the secular leveraging in the developed economies:
The problem I have with the recent history of growth in the United States, the United Kingdom, Spain and Ireland in particular is that the growth was underpinned by high debt accumulation and low savings. As debt is a mechanism through which we pull demand forward, the debt and consumption has meant we have been growing today at the expense of future growth.
Low quality growth can go on for a long time
This dynamic can continue for a very, very long time. In the United States, by virtue of America’s possession of the world’s reserve currency, an increase in aggregate debt levels has been successfully financed for well over twenty-five years. Mind you, there have been a number of landmines along the way. But, time and again, these pitfalls have been avoided through asymmetric monetary policy and counter-cyclical fiscal expansion.
So, poor quality growth can continue for very long indeed. And it is this fact which allows the narrative of easy money and overconsumption to gain sway.
The boy who cried wolf
A soothsayer who counsels against this type of economic policy, but who warns of impending collapse will surely be seen as the boy who cries wolf. Think back to 2001 or 2002. Did we not witness then the same spectacle whereby the bears and doomsayers were let out of their holes to warn of impending doom from reckless economic policy? By 2004, unless these individuals changed their tune, they were long forgotten or even laughed at – only to resurface in 2007 and 2008 with their new tales of woe. Knowing this shapes the psychology of economic forecasting and is why missing the turn is disastrous for one’s career. Efforts to avoid missing the turn are also part of a very large pro-cyclical psychological force underpinning a cyclical bull market.
The fact is: low quality growth does not lead to immediate economic calamity. It can continue through many business cycles. Even today, it is wholly conceivable that we could experience a multi-year economic expansion on the back of renewed monetary and fiscal expansion.
Marc Faber: “Don’t underestimate the power of printing money”
You will recall that I wrote a post at the depths of the market implosion highlighting a phrase by Marc Faber, “Don’t underestimate the power of printing money.” This quote has stuck with me as asset markets have soared in the intervening time. What Faber was alluding to was the fact that printing money works. It does goose the economy as intended and it can induce a cyclical recovery.
Nevertheless, the recovery is likely to be of poor quality due to significant malinvestment. Debt levels will rise and capital investment will be directed toward riskier enterprises. Look at what’s happening in China. Are you telling me stimulus is not working? It most certainly is.
In the west, stimulus is also working. It is designed to stop people from hoarding cash and to consume. It is also designed to get people out of savings accounts and into riskier asset classes. it is doing just that.
But, remember, the developed world has a lot of problems to work through. The origins of the next crisis are already apparent – and they have nothing to do with cyclical upturns and everything to do with a secular trend of rising indebtedness, now in both the public and private sectors in developed economies. If the developed economies use this cyclical upturn wisely to reduce household debt levels, to increase private sector savings, to clean up the balance sheets of weak banks, and to cautiously normalize fiscal and monetary policy, we will be in a much better position to counteract economic weakness when the next downturn hits.
Hi Ed,
Thanks, these outlook posts are very useful! It’s hard to find fault with much you’ve written here. I am curious as to your thoughts on a few things you didn’t mention (either in comments or potential future post(s)):
1. You (and Calculated Risk, among others) make the good point that double dips are rare when investment is already so low. However, what are your thoughts on the odds of a traditional inventory-driven recession in 2011? Have you followed the inventory data lately to see if the increases (they have been a big contributor to recent GDP growth) have gotten too optimistic with respect to likely GDP growth rates?
While an inventory led recession would likely be relatively mild, it could trigger something deeper given lingering private debt issues.
2. I have personally been surprised that the household savings rate has not risen further than it did (and it has recently been declining again). Surveys I’ve seen of boomers’ savings shows a dramatic shortfall in their ability to fund their current lifestyles in retirement, and they are starting to turn 65 this year. Do you think this resolves smoothly/gradually via them simply working longer on aggregate? Or very gradually increasing savings such that it is only a small drag on GDP growth? (Maybe they already have done so sufficiently). Etc? I realize this is more of a medium term trend than something that is likely to cause a 2011 macro “shock”, but the direction of the household savings rate is clearly important to projecting GDP growth rates. And yes I know it’s probably tied to the question of which way asset prices go from here…
3. You’ve probably seen the charts showing us tracking Japan’s historical multi-year disinflation pretty closely. Calculated Risk seems to think rents have bottomed, which among other factors could contribute to breaking this downtrend for the US. Curious if you think we’ll break that out of that Japan-like trend given our higher unemployment rate but more favorable demographics (two differences of note). This point would relate to the bond outlook post, also…
You saw the Rosenberg post. I think he has the secular forces done right. What he misses is the cyclical trend toward renewed over consumption. I expect savings to fall again as recovery takes hold such that when the next downturn hits baby boomers are unprepared for retirement.
Hi Ed,
Thanks, these outlook posts are very useful! It’s hard to find fault with much you’ve written here. I am curious as to your thoughts on a few things you didn’t mention (either in comments or potential future post(s)):
1. You (and Calculated Risk, among others) make the good point that double dips are rare when investment is already so low. However, what are your thoughts on the odds of a traditional inventory-driven recession in 2011? Have you followed the inventory data lately to see if the increases (they have been a big contributor to recent GDP growth) have gotten too optimistic with respect to likely GDP growth rates?
While an inventory led recession would likely be relatively mild, it could trigger something deeper given lingering private debt issues.
2. I have personally been surprised that the household savings rate has not risen further than it did (and it has recently been declining again). Surveys I’ve seen of boomers’ savings shows a dramatic shortfall in their ability to fund their current lifestyles in retirement, and they are starting to turn 65 this year. Do you think this resolves smoothly/gradually via them simply working longer on aggregate? Or very gradually increasing savings such that it is only a small drag on GDP growth? (Maybe they already have done so sufficiently). Etc? I realize this is more of a medium term trend than something that is likely to cause a 2011 macro “shock”, but the direction of the household savings rate is clearly important to projecting GDP growth rates. And yes I know it’s probably tied to the question of which way asset prices go from here…
3. You’ve probably seen the charts showing us tracking Japan’s historical multi-year disinflation pretty closely. Calculated Risk seems to think rents have bottomed, which among other factors could contribute to breaking this downtrend for the US. Curious if you think we’ll break that out of that Japan-like trend given our higher unemployment rate but more favorable demographics (two differences of note). This point would relate to the bond outlook post, also…
You saw the Rosenberg post. I think he has the secular forces done right. What he misses is the cyclical trend toward renewed over consumption. I expect savings to fall again as recovery takes hold such that when the next downturn hits baby boomers are unprepared for retirement.
Hi Edward,
This is a great forecast. I can’t find anything to argue with it, either. As you saw, low quality growth can go on for quite a while, and it seems apparent that at least so far the USA is very closely following in the footsteps of Japan. And for this year anyways, the indicators do at least point to a slowly growing economy – although perhaps not nearly enough to make much of a dent in the employment situation.
When you think about it, it’s a very scary thought that the USA has 8 million fewer jobs now than it did just a few years ago. Even the absolute best of optimistic forecasts don’t call for those 8 million jobs to be “made up” in less than 6 years. And that’s assuming no further recessions and normal growth during this period – an event I have a hard time visualizing.
Because of this, I can’t quite shake the feeling that when the next downturn hits (whenever that might be) will be exceptionally ugly. If 2010 and 2011 are going to be the “best years” of the recovery, it does make me wonder what the years of future downturns will be like. With the bloated public balance sheets and the total wildcard of what is happening in China, it seems that the governments will not be able to do nearly as much to combat future downturns as they did in this one. And should they try, i also have to wonder just how effective it will be – perhaps a case of nearing the point of diminishing returns as Japan seems to regarding the effectiveness of printing money.
One thing that does trouble me about this year, however, and you touched upon it in your edit – commodity prices. This winter reminds me quite a bit of the winter of 2007/2008 – when commodity prices were high and right before the blow-off top in the summer of 2008. It does not take a leap of imagination to realize that $4+ gas across the USA, coupled with increasing prices in basic necessities, is going to have a negative effect on growth, not to mention cause a big dose of demand destruction. Whether or not the higher cost of energy/necessities is enough to tip the USA into outright recession is unknown (compared to the 70’s, I read somewhere that the energy component of the country is much less), but I do know it will not help!
That all said, I do think the USA is ahead of the rest of the world in one very important way that you didn’t mention. The collapse in housing prices (with more still to come) here in the USA is way, way ahead of what’s been happening in other countries. Thus, the negative drag housing has had on the economy is closer to the end than the beginning. I also think the “worse is over” in terms of housing price declines. I live in Nevada – epicenter of the housing bust – and the price declines have slowed dramatically from the waterfall decline seen in 2007-2009 period. While more declines are happening and will happen in the year or two ahead, the rate of decline will be much less. And because of this decline, compared to past decades, housing affordability in the USA is nearing multi-decade highs in large swaths of the country.
I touch on this issue because that is one thing that is a big wildcard in future forecasts – will the housing bubbles in other countries pop this year? Canada, Australia, certainly China, and even much of Europe have seen housing prices soar the past few years – and exceed by many metrics the crazy valuations seen here in Nevada/USA during the peak of the boom.
So I guess my question to you is this. What will the effect of a housing/property bubble bust in the rest of the world have on the USA? And that’s of course assuming you agree with me that other countries have a property bubble that could very well bust this year.
There’s also a second wildcard that needs to be remembered. As you mentioned in your forecast, China is a poster child right now for malinvestment. Eventually that malinvestment will come to an end, with the result being a dramatic drop in the use of commodities. I have a hard time seeing a dramatic drop happening this year, but certainly in the next few years the massive investment in China will start to slow.
What effect do you think that will have on the growth in the USA and the rest of the world if investment in China slows down or suddenly drops to very low levels?
Hi Edward,
This is a great forecast. I can’t find anything to argue with it, either. As you saw, low quality growth can go on for quite a while, and it seems apparent that at least so far the USA is very closely following in the footsteps of Japan. And for this year anyways, the indicators do at least point to a slowly growing economy – although perhaps not nearly enough to make much of a dent in the employment situation.
When you think about it, it’s a very scary thought that the USA has 8 million fewer jobs now than it did just a few years ago. Even the absolute best of optimistic forecasts don’t call for those 8 million jobs to be “made up” in less than 6 years. And that’s assuming no further recessions and normal growth during this period – an event I have a hard time visualizing.
Because of this, I can’t quite shake the feeling that when the next downturn hits (whenever that might be) will be exceptionally ugly. If 2010 and 2011 are going to be the “best years” of the recovery, it does make me wonder what the years of future downturns will be like. With the bloated public balance sheets and the total wildcard of what is happening in China, it seems that the governments will not be able to do nearly as much to combat future downturns as they did in this one. And should they try, i also have to wonder just how effective it will be – perhaps a case of nearing the point of diminishing returns as Japan seems to regarding the effectiveness of printing money.
One thing that does trouble me about this year, however, and you touched upon it in your edit – commodity prices. This winter reminds me quite a bit of the winter of 2007/2008 – when commodity prices were high and right before the blow-off top in the summer of 2008. It does not take a leap of imagination to realize that $4+ gas across the USA, coupled with increasing prices in basic necessities, is going to have a negative effect on growth, not to mention cause a big dose of demand destruction. Whether or not the higher cost of energy/necessities is enough to tip the USA into outright recession is unknown (compared to the 70’s, I read somewhere that the energy component of the country is much less), but I do know it will not help!
That all said, I do think the USA is ahead of the rest of the world in one very important way that you didn’t mention. The collapse in housing prices (with more still to come) here in the USA is way, way ahead of what’s been happening in other countries. Thus, the negative drag housing has had on the economy is closer to the end than the beginning. I also think the “worse is over” in terms of housing price declines. I live in Nevada – epicenter of the housing bust – and the price declines have slowed dramatically from the waterfall decline seen in 2007-2009 period. While more declines are happening and will happen in the year or two ahead, the rate of decline will be much less. And because of this decline, compared to past decades, housing affordability in the USA is nearing multi-decade highs in large swaths of the country.
I touch on this issue because that is one thing that is a big wildcard in future forecasts – will the housing bubbles in other countries pop this year? Canada, Australia, certainly China, and even much of Europe have seen housing prices soar the past few years – and exceed by many metrics the crazy valuations seen here in Nevada/USA during the peak of the boom.
So I guess my question to you is this. What will the effect of a housing/property bubble bust in the rest of the world have on the USA? And that’s of course assuming you agree with me that other countries have a property bubble that could very well bust this year.
There’s also a second wildcard that needs to be remembered. As you mentioned in your forecast, China is a poster child right now for malinvestment. Eventually that malinvestment will come to an end, with the result being a dramatic drop in the use of commodities. I have a hard time seeing a dramatic drop happening this year, but certainly in the next few years the massive investment in China will start to slow.
What effect do you think that will have on the growth in the USA and the rest of the world if investment in China slows down or suddenly drops to very low levels?
I cant speak for every one but I do expect that many if not most baby boomers are done with over consumption. I speak from a married with 2.0 children perspective. I cant wait to throw things out (give things with value) away. We are trying to reduce owning things, and increase wealth. The poor are getting more poor, the middle class consumer is wounded.
We have homes (not condos) in our high end gated community fee association that are 24-36 months in default and no foreclosure by bank.
I cant speak for every one but I do expect that many if not most baby boomers are done with over consumption. I speak from a married with 2.0 children perspective. I cant wait to throw things out (give things with value) away. We are trying to reduce owning things, and increase wealth. The poor are getting more poor, the middle class consumer is wounded.
We have homes (not condos) in our high end gated community fee association that are 24-36 months in default and no foreclosure by bank.